Split by the atom
Political divisions threaten nuclear powers role in Europe's energy transition
On Saturday, Germany’s three remaining nuclear facilities were shutdown. The plants - Emsland, Neckarwestheim II and Isar II - provided 4 GW of power to the country’s electricity grid.
The closures marks the end of long planned decision to stop nuclear generation in Germany, a technology that some critics argue is unsafe and unsustainable. Years of anti-nuclear protests had put pressure on successive German governments to phase out the technology. And then, in the aftermath of Japan’s 2011 Fukushima disaster in which an earthquake and tsunami caused three nuclear meltdowns, Chancellor Angela Merkel set 2022 as the deadline for Germany’s nuclear generation.
Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the spike in energy prices, the current German Chancellor, Olaf Scholz agreed to a one-off extension to 15th April 2023. Of those other EU countries (among them Spain, Switzerland, Belgium) that also agreed in 2011 to phase out nuclear power, the Belgian government overturned its energy strategy in light of the energy crisis and reached an agreement to extend the life of two of its newest nuclear reactors by 10 years, abandoning the previous plan to exit nuclear power by 2025. For Germany though, 15th April was the final cut off.
The day after Germany’s final reactors closed, Finland's 1.6 GW Olkiluoto 3 (OL3) nuclear reactor, Europe's largest and the first to be built for 16 years, began generating electricity. The facility is 14 years late. Construction at the plant began in 2005, however technical issues including a string of breakdowns and outages prevented the operators from sticking to OL3 original four year construction timeline.
Nuclear power divides Europe. Until this past weekend, 13 EU member states generated electricity with nuclear power, while 14 did not. Germany has now completely pivoted away from nuclear energy, but other countries are far more sympathetic to the benefits that the zero carbon, baseload power technology provides. Rather than being a uniform nuclear family of countries all pulling in the same direction, the dysfunctional nature of the European family of member states increases the risk of political uncertainty.
In September 2021, Poland announced plans to construct six nuclear reactors, with the first to be completed by 2033 and the rest due to follow by 2043. The country has long sought to pivot from thermal coal to nuclear. In August 2022 the government approved legislation aimed at speeding up nuclear preparation and implementation.
In December 2021, the Netherlands coalition government proposed constructing two new nuclear power plants. Construction is scheduled to start in 2028, near the country’s only nuclear facility, with the reactors due to be built by 2035.
On 10th February 2022, two weeks before the Russian invasion of Ukraine, French President, Emmanuel Macron announced plans to build six nuclear reactors in the country, starting by 2028 with the first scheduled reactor to begin operations by 2035, plus an option to construct eight more reactors by 2050.
Last but not least, Sweden’s new government have proposed introducing a new law that would lift the current limit of 10 nuclear reactors in only three locations. Sweden has six operating reactors, but it did have twice this number prior to 2011. An amendment to the law is scheduled to enter into force in March 2024. No indication has been given so far as to the number of new reactors, nor the timescale for their construction.
The typical motives provided by politicians for the rebound in interest given to nuclear include energy security (especially in the aftermath of the Russian invasion), fears over the high price of energy (ditto), and the low carbon baseload electricity generation nuclear delivers (in order to first meet the EU's Fit for 55 targets and then net zero by 2050).
There are two other related reasons why countries should be so keen to ramp up their nuclear generation. The first is that power consumption is likely to soar due to the energy transition - more EV’s, heat pumps, industrial electrification, etc. That means more demand for baseload power (see A margin of safety).
The second is that countries will be increasingly dependent on power hungry processes to produce green hydrogen and other green commodities such as H-DRI vital to decarbonise their heavy industries - the latter is particularly attractive for France and Sweden (see Europe's bridge to 'green' steel).
However, the ongoing historical division in Europe between supporters and detractors of nuclear power threatens the expansion of the technology. EU negotiations recently led to nuclear powered hydrogen production (so-called pink hydrogen) being labelled as ‘low carbon’, rather than green. Proponents of the argument that nuclear should be classed as green - in the same bucket as renewables - contend that it is a vital step in attracting the necessary capital to help build out nuclear capacity.
Countries intent on pushing on with nuclear face a number of headwinds, most notably underestimating the construction time necessary to build a nuclear reactor. Finland's Olkiluoto 3 reactor took 18 years to finish after all! What lessons can we learn from the history of nuclear construction?
The median time to build a nuclear reactor is 6.3 years, according to analysis conducted by
.After digging into the construction times of all nuclear reactors across the world since the 1950’s, the author Hannah Ritchie also uncovered an extreme right-skewed distribution. Although some reactors are built in as little as 3-5 years, others take multiple decades to complete. Overall, two-thirds of the reactors built since the 1950’s took less than 8 years between the first laying of concrete to the date that commercial operations began.
If we focus on only those plants where construction began since 1990 its clear that the build time is reduced - the median build time is 5.7 years. The distribution also shows less skew as well with all reactors builds completed within 15 years. There has been a notable shift in the geographical location in which reactors have been built since the 1990’s. Prior to this period, construction was predominantly based in Europe and North America, however since the 1990’s construction has been focused on Asia.
After controlling for factors such as the reactor type, the size of the facility, and the geographical location, two related factors appear to be important in determining the speed at which reactors are built according to
:The political and economic context is key. When the objectives underpinning these priorities align, good things happen to nuclear reactor timescales. Necessity is the mother of invention:
In the 1960s and 1970s, electricity demand was rising quickly in France, the UK, US and other rich countries. They built quickly because delays meant blackouts. Countries such as China and South Korea have been in that position more recently. The urgency is not the same across Europe and the US anymore (other than the urgency of decarbonising their electricity grids…) which might explain why they build very little nuclear and when they do it is slower than it used to be.
Second, (un)learning curves. One of the factors behind the strong performance of Asia’s nuclear builds versus the recent experience in Europe and North America is the cumulative gain and loss respectively of the skills and insight necessary to deliver nuclear projects on time. As the article highlights, countries learn by doing big projects often They benefit from learning by doing. However, as the frequency reduces and skills are lost to other countries a process of unlearning plagues build times:
Jessica Lovering and Jameson McBride found that ‘learning rates’ for nuclear reactors were positive in France in the 1950s and 1960s, and in South Korea more recently. In both cases the reactors designs were standardised. They learned by doing the same thing over and over. In most other countries and periods, learning rates were negative.
The current economic and political context should have been a strong foundation for the expansion of nuclear generation in Europe. Energy insecurity, high electricity prices, and tough carbon emission reduction targets to meet.
History tells us that nuclear reactors can be built in as little as 3.5 years and easily in less than 5 years. If only there is the economic incentive and political will to make it happen.
Unfortunately, political divisions over the role of nuclear power within Europe and the prospect of further infighting in the future adds to the risk that investors face. This risk adds to the cost, and increases the risk of interruptions.
Delays that Europe can ill afford if it really intends to hit its climate targets.
Great headline!